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The Denver metro region, like many areas of the country, is experiencing
rapid growth in a context of weak regional institutions and multiple jurisdic-
tions within the region, hi March 1997, representative elected officials from
cities and counties on the Board of Directors of the Denver Regional Council
of Governments (DRCOG) voted almost unanimously to approve the Metro-
Vision 2020 Plan specifying a 700 square mile extent of development in
2020. This plan represented an increase of about 150 square miles over the
region's existing 550 square mile extent, somewhat less than through the lens
of dispute resolution theory, a case study of Denver' s regional planning pro-
cess offers insight for planners involved in voluntary regional planning ef-
forts in other areas of the country.
Historical Overview
Starting around 1990, DRCOG took a different approach to regional
planning. Whereas the agency had been promoting concepts such as urban
centers that had been around for decades, DRCOG planners sought and re-
ceived permission to conduct a wider, more participatory planning process.
Skyrocketing population growth averaging about 10.9% annually in the
southern three counties between 1990 and 1994 (Romano 1994:31A) added
impetus to the effort. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the Inter-
modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 created additional in-
centives. These Acts required metropolitan regions to create a fiscally-
constrained plan for future transportation investments, as well as one that
would not exacerbate air quality, congestion, vehicle miles traveled, and auto
dependence. Tax and spending constraints imposed by referenda also limited
the state' s ability to invest in new infrastructure and required the State to fig-
ure out ways to return tax dollars when the burgeoning population growth
boosted state income.
Early MetroVision committees carefully examined alternative growth
patterns and produced a regional "Framework" for growth management, in-
cluding these six core elements:
• Development confined to 700 square miles in 2020, accommodating
population growth and adding 150 square miles to the area.
CAROLINA PLANNING • WINTER 1999 51
MARIE VENNER
• Free-standing communities of Boul-
der, Brighton, Castle Rock, and
Longmont, separate from the urban
area, with an adequate employment-
housing balance and internal trans-
portation systems.
• Urban Centers—a range of activity
centers in the region that serve as tran-
sit destinations; support retail, em-
ployment, and housing; contain higher
densities than the regional average;
and encourage pedestrian-oriented
travel.
• A balanced, multimodal transporta-
tion system that improves the existing
system and includes rapid transit, a
bus network, regional beltways, and
bike and pedestrian facilities.
• Open space—a regional open space
system that shapes the region's form,
protects environmental resources, and
provides recreational opportunities.
• Environmental quality—acknowl-
edging that the location and type of
growth and development have signifi-
cant effects on the region's air and
water.
DRCOG Board approved the guiding
ideas in the Framework and appointed a
Steering Committee (SC) to discuss imple-
mentation of the plan. In order to build owner-
ship among this key constituency, three-
fourths of the 15-20 members were elected
officials. Representatives from environmental,
neighborhood, and business interests made up
the balance.
At the first meeting, elected officials made
it clear that they would not seek additional
authority for the regional agency and would
only endorse a voluntary plan. Subsequently,
the Steering Conmiittee devoted itself to ex-
plaining the needs and issues of the partici-
pants at the table, particularly those of local
jurisdictions as seen through the eyes of
elected officials.
DRCOG described the Steering Commit-
tee's agreement on (the) six core elements as
"critical to the implementation of MetroVi-
sion" and "a major achievement of the group"
(DRCOG 1996:3). They reaffirmed the concept
of a 700 square mile limit to the metro area in
2020, though the Urban Growth Boundary line
and accompanying flexibility provisions were not
negotiated and approved until December 1997,
with a minor upward adjustment to 730 square
miles. DRCOG staff have been careful to avoid
pushing member jurisdictions too hard, feeling
that the agreement has always been "tenuous at
best" (Woodard 1997). Nevertheless, agreement
on both the actual boundary and policies for
transferring growth from one area to another
within the boundary is a significant achievement.
Despite the recent failure of a transit ballot initia-
tive, the Board members on the MetroVision
Policy Committee decided to retain the transit
core element.
Meet the Players:
A Stakeholder Analysis
The Steering Committee brought together
stakeholders fi-om the sectors active in the initial
visioning and scenario evaluation process with a
broader group of elected officials than had previ-
ously participated. In explaining the negotiation
process, this analysis of the power, resources,
interests, and strategy focuses on six major
stakeholders: the Denver Regional Council of
Governments, the city of Denver, the surrounding
suburbs, the business community, homeowners,
and envirormiental groups.
Stakeholder: Denver Regional
Council of Governments (DRCOG)
Power: As a designated Metropolitan Plan-
ning Organization (MPO) under ISTEA, DRCOG
controls the purse strings for transportation proj-
ects in the region. ISTEA confers the power to the
Transportation Division of DRCOG to prioritize
transportation projects, to detail the criteria by
which projects will be evaluated, and to utilize
federal mandates and regional development goals
as outlined in MetroVision. As the largest section,
governing annual expenditures far in excess of
any other section, the Transportation Division of
DRCOG has traditionally enjoyed a large amount
of independence and power within the agency.
However, the section has not utilized this power
to advance a system to evaluate proposed projects
52 CAROLINA PLANNING • WINTER 1999
REINING IN DENVER'S SPRAWL
that favor either compact growth or alternative
transportation modes.
The Development Services Division of
DRCOG is much smaller, with comparatively
less authority and less ability to dictate their
agenda. DRCOG gives approval for the con-
struction of lift stations for the central sewer
authority and provides input to decisions of
the State Water Quality
Control Commission.
. . . ffi^
The Development t^r ^ ^7• •
Services Division MetroVlSlOn
provides population prOCeSS. .
.
and employment data
opened the
for regional planmng ^
and local governments regional
as well as for the plannins,
transportation division. '^ °
Like most voluntary pWCeSS tO a
councils of
^ider group
governments, DRCOG
u
has traditionally been trlCin ever
weak and relatively before and
ineffective at ,
,
controlling growth OrOUgrlt
across multiple ju- technical
risdictions. , . ^
The agency itself analysis tO
has no state-enabled participants'
planning enforcement /^,,^/
authority. The Board of ^^^^^
Directors, comprised of
locally appointed elected officials from each
jurisdiction, exerts significant influence over
the agency's direction. Withdrawal of dues or
an uprising on the Board loom as implicit
threats over any DRCOG staff action that the
Board of Directors perceives as "out of line."
DRCOG' s power emerges from the staffs
technical expertise and leadership position in
organizing committee agendas and framing
complex issues. Arguably, the staffs power
.
increases with the technical complexity of the
subject or process at hand and the resulting
need for expert leadership. However, the
MetroVision process, largely conducted by the
Development Services Division, opened the
regional planning process to a wider group
than ever before and brought technical analy-
sis to participants' level. In doing so, they en-
abled democratic decisions to be made on com-
mittees.
Resources: DRCOG' s main resource is its
staff time, expertise, and leadership. In addition,
DRCOG enjoys wide respect as a source of data,
and its staff has a reputation as technically excel-
lent and honest brokers. DRCOG' s Development
Services staff has served as negotiators with indi-
vidual municipalities over allocations of popula-
tion and urban land development. This work gives
DRCOG staff a politically and technically keen
understanding of municipal population growth
and development issues.
Interests: The interests of DRCOG staff may
be distinguished from those of the local elected
officials comprising the Board of Directors.
DRCOG staff works full time for an agency with
a regional focus, whereas the elected officials
hold primary allegiance to their local govern-
ments. By implication, those sitting on the Board
of Directors will support regional goals as long as
local priorities are not compromised. Meanwhile,
DRCOG staff is professionally focused on ad-
dressing regional concerns and complying with
federal mandates, in a manner that is acceptable
to local authorities.
The key interests of the Transportation Divi-
sion were to recommend technically sound proj-
ects that would ease congestion in the region;
produce objective project rankings that would
stand up to the more subjective considerations of
political representatives on oversight committees;
implicitly maintain the section's independence
and power within the agency; keep transit plan-
ning at the Regional Transportation District
(RTD); and reserve federal State Transportation
Program (STP) funds for non-transit transporta-
tion needs, mainly roads. Transportation staff
showed little interest in what they saw as a De-
velopment Services exercise of questionable fu-
ture and marginal feasibility.
Strategy: DRCOG staff saw their role
largely as coordinators, though the leadership
potential of their position was particularly im-
portant to early MetroVision staff members. Staff
who came on board in the late 1980's and early
1990' s were more willing to take a more proac-
tive role, not having suffered through the lack of
cooperation from municipalities around the re-
gion on earlier development plans and informa-
tion collection activities. Staff devoted to serving
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the earlier MetroVision Task Force presented
considerable background information on pro-
gressive options and lobbied for a thorough
analysis of the impacts of multiple growth
scenarios. Behind the scenes, more enthusias-
tic staff funneled additional information to
like-minded stakeholders on how growth man-
agement was being accomplished elsewhere.
Like their successors serving the Steering
Committee and subsequent MetroVision Pol-
icy Committee, DRCOG staff evaluated prog-
ress internally and plarmed agendas for up-
coming meetings at weekly strategy sessions.
They revised discussion drafts based on
stakeholder feedback in committee meetings,
attempting to remain true to the changes and
desires expressed by committee members.
They presented information and served as in-
formal facilitators at some meetings.
As the process evolved and broadened,
staff turnover occurred and elected officials
began to play a larger role. Throughout this
transition, DRCOG' s MetroVision leadership
began to play a "more conciliatory" role
(Woodard 1996). In particular, DRCOG made
a strategic decision to cater to elected offi-
cials' private concerns that the agency would
involve the pubhc and potentially make an end
run around elected officials' authority.
The Steering Committee began its work
with substantial opposition to the Framework
recently approved by the Board and many of
the Committee's own members. Given this
opposition, DRCOG decided to play a less
visible role and avoid a potentially controver-
sial one in which staff could appear to be
pushing the plan. Instead, staff brought in out-
side facilitators with particular credibility with
elected officials.
DRCOG' s Transportation Division opted
for minimal participation in the MetroVision
process and little coordination occurred be-
tween the different sections. In this manner,
DRCOG lacked a unified internal strategy, a
weakness that only revealed itself after the
Steering Committee completed its work.
Stakeholder: City ofDenver
Interests: Hemmed in by an inner ring of
poorer suburbs and an outer ring of richer
ones, the City and County of Denver share
many of the problems and interests as other cen-
tral cities. Financial stability is important to the
city, and infill, re-development, and limited new
development opportunities in this land-locked
jurisdiction have traditionally offered few oppor-
tunities to extend and solidify the city's tax base.
As the hub of a large region trying to maintain an
attractive metropolitan identity in the national
economy, the unified City and County of Denver
has particular interest in maintaining aspects of
the area's quality of life
such as open space, air Hemmed in
quality, and transportation
systems. by an inner
From the city's ring nf
perspective, large suburban
expenditures for new roads pOOVer
and wastewater treatment suburbs and
could drain funds that
might otherwise be applied ^'^ OUier
to transit, which would rinQ of
connect the region and . t
enhance the viability of the ^^^ner oneS,
downtovra and inner the City and
suburbs^ Denver preferred
^^
r
an enforceable regional -^ •'
plan that unified land use, Denver
air quality, and
share many
transportation planmng, -^
interests that were identical Oj the
to those of DRCOG' s nroblems
MetroVision staff.
Resources: Resources ana
at Denver's disposal interests aS
included its financial and
,
technical support and the Oiner
influence and visibility of central
Mayor Wellington Webb.
Power: Denver's CltieS.
power on DRCOG Board
and the MetroVision committees has been am-
biguous. Denver contributes more to DRCOG
than any other municipality, but the city has never
exercised an option in the by-laws for voting
weighted by contributions. Elected officials in
Denver's suburbs feel relatively self-sufficient in
their abilities to attract new business, diminishing
Denver's negotiating power. Denver often com-
prises just one more voice, albeit one more no-
ticeable than the smaller suburbs.
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Strategy: Denver allocated resources to
the MetroVision effort including staff mem-
bers who played a leading role early in the
process. Denver also consistently supported
DRCOG's efforts and allied with environ-
mental interests, which tended to support the
interests of the central city. Denver may have
opted not to maximize the use of one of their
stronger resources, as their highest elected
officials rarely participated in the process.
Some participants in earlier MetroVision
committees noted Mayor Webb's ability to
exert a significant influence in meetings, and
the ability of such a high ranking official to
change or add weight to the tenor of the dis-
cussion. Though a Council member still par-
ticipates, MetroVision may have declined in
importance to Denver as the central city has
begun to enjoy a spectacular renaissance.
Stakeholder: Surrounding Suburbs
Interests: Suburbs dominate the remain-
ing local jurisdictions with Boulder, Brighton,
Castle Rock, and Longmont separate from the
contiguous metro area. Most suburban elected
officials came into the process with a self-
described "preservation" interest in maintain-
ing local control (Tauer 1996). Nevertheless,
most recognize the importance of a regional
perspective and the need to act on regional
issues. As local jurisdictions began to use their
voice in the Steering Committee, they made
their position clear: they did not want man-
dates or interference by other jurisdictions,
even neighboring ones. They wanted a volun-
tary, collaborative approach. Despite apparent
unanimity on local control, significant diver-
sity and tensions exist among the subiu-ban
municipalities. Much of the tension arises out
of different growth management programs
employed by the jurisdictions. On the one
hand, Boulder and Golden have had open
space and slow growth initiatives, though one
of the latter failed in Boulder in the 1996 elec-
tion. On the other hand, the Cities of Thorn-
ton, Commerce City, Aurora, and Arapahoe
and Douglas Counties continue to seek
growth. Sales taxes, not the traditional prop-
erty taxes, are the financial lifeblood of Den-
ver area jurisdictions. The resulting competi-
tion for retail development complicates coop-
eration and predisposes many jurisdictions toward
growth; in some municipalities capital improve-
ment plans incorporate funding from projected
shopping malls.
Power: Given the "home rule" political envi-
ronment, suburban elected officials and planning
staff has a critical say in whether regional growth
management will occur. The key power of local
elected officials' is their support or opposition of a
plan, which is able to make or break any growth
management effort. They exercise this power in
the media, on committees, and among colleagues.
The DRCOG Board of Directors, comprised of a
representative from each of these 41 jurisdictions,
ultimately decides whether a regional plan moves
forward.
Resources: Local planners provided data and
projections for the regional effort. In some cases
the work and position of the planning staff hin-
dered regional coordination. In other cases, plan-
ning staff enabled the critical support of an
elected official by showing that needed reductions
in land area could be accomplished.
Strategy: Local elected officials skeptical of
growth management utilized all the strength of
their negotiating position. They knew that the
more powerful one's position, the smaller the ne-
gotiating margin needs to be:
[Though]negotiations presuppose that neither
party has absolute power,...power increases
if the costs of not reaching a settlement hurt
your opponent more than they hurt you... the
stronger you feel, the narrower the margin
between your most favored position and your
limit...and the greater your commitment to
your opening /josirion. [Kennedy 1982: 138-9]
The local elected officials made an early
mandate declaring any increased regional author-
ity to be off-limits. This stance depended upon
the credibility of the elected officials' supposedly
immovable position and the other stakeholders'
unattractive or improbable alternatives to nego-
tiation — ballot measures (recently failed) or
proposals for state-enacted growth management
(unlikely).
Even though the media, interest groups, and
DRCOG often accuse sprawling suburbs of gen-
erating traffic, congestion, and pollution, some
suburbs were set to pin that blame on Denver in
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the most recent rounds of Committee meet-
ings. Some planned to use the sell-out crowds
at the new baseball stadium and other down-
town traffic generators to blame increased
traffic on Denver and undercut the argument
for an urban growth boundary and confine-
ment of the urban area to 700 square miles in
2020.
Stakeholder: Business Community
Interests: Most participating business
leaders saw strong benefits in maintaining the
region's quality of life. As long as developers
could build to accommodate demand, they had
few objections to an urban growth boundary
(UGB).' The UGB and urban centers con-
cepts could even support developers' interests
in building at the higher densities they desired
in certain areas. Business leaders appreciated
both flexibiUty and predictability, inhibiting a
strong position on either the UGB or urban
centers in the Steering Committee process.
Power: Business leaders saw themselves
as having significant power, an impression
shared by local
elected officials. In the
The business
MetroVisiOYl
community also felt ^*^ i^i'uvi:^ lun
they had significant pWCeSS,
power to rally ly^sineSS
opposition to an
undesirable participants
outcome later in the
^^^^ helped the
process. With the
exception of group maintain
Boulder, developers ^ regional
have always en-
joyed a strong perspective in
negotiating position theface of
in the metro area . ,
and expect this to P^rceiVea
continue. "parochialism"
Resources: In h^ the elected
addition to a strong "> ^'^^^
i neu
voice, business officidls
groups enjoy
substantial financial resources. In the past,
business leaders considered private consorti-
ums to fund light rail transit and participated
actively on state and regional transportation
funding campaigns such as the Governor's
Blue Ribbon Panel on Transportation (1995-96).
Business leaders and mayors were among the
most outspoken proponents of the extensive rail
system and regional transit initiative named
Guide the Ride. In the MetroVision process, busi-
ness participants often helped the group maintain
a regional perspective in the face of perceived
"parochialism" by the elected officials.
Strategy: Business leaders saw little to con-
tribute to a Steering Committee process largely
focused on identifying and resolving the concerns
of local elected officials.^ As the Committee
stretched from the original three month estimate
into a full year, the business representatives lost
patience with the process of slowly generating
consensus. They saw no role for themselves and
perceived the process as a waste of time for them.
The general impression they communicated to
DRCOG was "call us back when you're ready to
make decisions." The business community had
sufficient faith in their strength and they did not
feel a need to be at the table throughout the proc-
ess to preserve their interests. Representatives
from the business community attended Steering
Committee meetings only sporadically, and envi-
ronmentalists ultimately recruited their support
for substantive commitments in the final agree-
ment.
Stakeholder: Community/Homeowners
Interests: As the sole community represen-
tative invited to participate on the Steering Com-
mittee, Janie Henley pointed out that one individ-
ual can hardly represent the diverse interests of
community members across the Denver metro
area. According to this representative, "neighbor-
hoods and quality of life go together," and to her
neighborhood quality of life meant low density
(Henley 1996). However, she did not consider the
status quo or future no-action scenario as viable
either; she aimed to produce implementation
strategies that she thought the public would un-
derstand and support. Despite citizens' desire for
cleaner air, most oppose multi-family infill. She
did not think that increased density, even in urban
centers, would sell well in the Denver area and
raised concerns about this on several occasions.
Elected officials also appreciated the political
difficulty of voting for infill development. The
interests of a large population of empty nesters,
urban professionals, renters, and others who
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might favor higher densities were not repre-
sented on the Steering Committee, except by
the environmentalists. More progressive
community interests were broadly represented
on the previous MetroVision 2020 Task Force,
which developed the Framework and the core
elements.
Resources: The community representa-
tive felt that the Committee looked to her for
fresh ideas and the perspective of an individ-
ual homeowner who had thought about re-
gional issues. Her presence and approval
added an extra degree of legitimacy to a
Steering Committee dominated by local
elected officials.
Power and Strategy: The power of the
community representative came mostly from
her good relations with the local government
attendees who requested her participation fol-
lowing her previous service on the Governor's
Smart Growth Inter-Regional Council (IRC).
In this manner, Henley helped execute the in-
terests and strategies of suburban elected offi-
cials, and at least neutralized potential opposi-
tion from citizen representatives and any po-
tential alliance with environmental represen-
tatives. Though elected officials encouraged
her participation, the perspective of the com-
munity had less influence on the Steering
Committee than on the previous MetroVision
Task Force. Like the business participants, the
community representative was unsure of what
contribution she could make to the Committee
and consequently, her involvement was lim-
ited.
Stakeholder: Environmental Interests
Interests: Enviroimiental groups sought
protection of air quality, open space, and the
area's distinctive enviroimiental resources;
they favored a regulatory approach, invest-
ments in transit, and action on the issues. For.
decades, environmental activists lobbied for
the construction of light rail or utilization of
the area's heavy rail for commuters. They fa-
vored new enabUng legislation that would give
DRCOG the authority to enforce compliance
with growth management plans.
Environmentalists had serious concems
about the probability of local officials per-
forming in any deal, and lobbied hard to in-
clude "effectiveness" along with elected officials'
"voluntary" and "collaborative" in the imple-
mentation tenets. Environmentahsts realized local
officials may well have allowed the Framework
to be approved without serious objections because
they would have a larger say and could reserve
fire for the core elements when implementation
procedures came to the fore in the Steering
Committee's work. Many officials had a "wait
and see" attitude and then raised more serious
objections as the plan became more concrete. Ju-
dith limes observed a similar dynamic in San Di-
ego, where the Growth Management Consensus
Project appeared to play a similar role to that of
the large and diverse MetroVision 2020 Task
Force.
Overall, local elected officials seemed not to
mix well with other types ofplayers, nor to be
able effectively to represent the concems of
local government in such mixed groups. Lo-
cal government representatives were not in-
fluential participants in (earlier growth man-
agement projects). While this... could be at-
tributed to lack of attendance, staff support,
and knowledge, an important factor in both
cases seemed to be the asymmetry of their re-
sponsibilities in comparison to other
stakeholders....a city official has to represent
a broad consensus across many
views. ...Moreover, local governments are at
the center of growth management. They had
much at stake but could not take the narrow
and effectivelyfocused positions that could be
taken by those representing a singular inter-
est.
Local officials frequently represented the
deeply held views that land use control is and
should always be a local function, while
many of the other players started with the be-
lief that local land use control is the cause of
the problem. The basic difference in style arul
substance made it difficult to achieve the
mutual understanding and respect necessary
for identifying and resolving differences.
Representatives of local government did far
better in working out their positions and
needs in groups made up of other elected of-
ficials or their staff. [Innes 1994:35]
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These reasons may explain the environ-
mentalists concerns and the local jurisdictions'
action on the MetroVision Task Force,
DRCOG's subsequent approval of the Frame-
work, and finally, elected officials' emphatic
dismissal of an enforceable approach on the
implementation Steering Committee.
Power: In some jurisdictions, particularly
those adjacent to the foothills, environmental
groups successfully placed growth control and
open space protection initiatives on the ballot.
Though the environmental representatives
never explicitly laid the threat on the table,
they informed various participants of their in-
tentions to move forward with a Fall 1998
ballot initiative if elected officials failed to
move forward with meaningful growth con-
trol.
Environmentalists also exerted their influ-
ence by trying to keep the issue in the public
eye. They had the power and the resolve to
"publicly blast" the Steering Committee proc-
ess if the Committee made no firm commit-
ments (Shaver 1996).
Elected officials' unwillingness to enter-
tain the environmentalists' preferred alterna-
tives restricted the enviroimientalists' room to
press their case during the meetings. The
power of environmental groups was also ham-
pered by the failure of growth control ballot
measures (open space proposals have been
more popular) and the low likelihood that the
State legislature would advance a more regu-
latory approach.
Nevertheless, environmental representa-
tives stayed involved in these discussions and
increased their power and credibility through
perfect attendance, what elected officials
called '-'reasonable" exchanges with other
Steering Committee members, and network-
ing.
Resources: Envirormiental group repre-
sentatives, often lawyers, brought technical
expertise to the process. Their main resource
was their ability to influence public opinion.
In addition, environmental groups enjoyed a
special relationship with the facilitators and
served DRCOG and the facilitators' purposes
in the negotiations by representing one end of
the spectrum. In this maimer, environmental-
ists' preferred alternatives provided a refer-
ence point fi-om which elected officials could dif-
ferentiate their own proposals, build ownership,
and gauge their success.
Strategy: The envirormiental representa-
tives on the Steering Committee—two attorneys
from Colorado Public Interest Research Group
(CoPIRG) and the Envirormiental Defense Fund
(EDF)—resisted taking an adversarial point of
view or pressing their case.'
The environmental attorneys could see that
elected officials faced tough issues at home and
that the Committee's work was a learning process
for them. They agreed with the facilitators' case
that if elected officials arrived at the same conclu-
sion on their own as they would have with the
envirormiental commimity weighing in, the local
officials commitment and resolve—their prob-
ability of performance in carrying out any agree-
ment—would be stronger. As one of the envi-
ronmental representatives noted, "If they (elected
officials) said it to each other, they were treated
with respect...basically, we found others to carry
the ball for us" (Shaver 1996). This behind the
scene approach required savvy use of networking
with potential supporters in all the involved par-
ties.
Factors in Agreement:
Consensus-Building Theory in Practice
DeNeufville and Christensen (1980) argue
that top-down regulation is only appropriate when
a society knows how
to do a task and agrees
^
^ ^ tOD-doWH
on a single objective.
As the stakeholder regulation is
analysis illustrates, Qyily appropriate
such agreement was
,
lacking in Denver. When a SOCiety
Innes concludes that knOWS hoW tO do
when goals and means
t h rl
are uncertain, as they ^ ^^"^^ ^^"'
are in growth agrees on a
management, • 7 1 • ^-
charismatic leadership
SmgleobjeCtlVe
or a social learning
strategy is needed (Innes 1992: 443). The Steer-
ing Committee relied on social learning to move
the group forward, with the help of active facili-
tation.
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Facilitation and Mediation
As a block of opponents to any regulatory
element coalesced on the Steering Committee
and members began questioning core elements
of the Framework, DRCOG decided to call in
professional facilitators. At the annual over-
night DRCOG Board retreat, one small town
mayor summed up the doubts of many elected
officials when she said that local officials do
not get elected by doing good for the region:
"I get elected every two years," she said. "I
need to be able to sell this to those with local
concerns spaiming over a much shorter pe-
riod," (Woodard 1996). A DRCOG staff per-
son highlighted the value of that comment,
and noted that it caused them to step back and
re-think their strategy.
DRCOG chose two facilitators, John Parr
and Peter Kenney, who would have credibility
with elected officials and other stakeholders
on the Committee. Gray (1989:165) notes that
"the power to mediate is derived, at least in
part, from the mediator's affiliations and par-
ticular interests." Parr's successful campaign
experience at the gubematorial and mayoral
levels may have given him extra pull with the
local elected officials. The second facilitator
enjoyed similar respect; Peter Kenney served
as chair of DRCOG' s Board of Directors for
many years in addition to his prominent roles
in Denver. Both worked with the National
Civic League. The mediators had significant
personal interest in reaching agreement on
growth management, as a culmination of their
personal and professional work in the region
over decades and as a potential highly visible
success for their budding private practice as
facilitators and mediators. Environmentalists
trusted Parr because he had managed cam-
paigns prominently featuring their concerns.
Confidence in the mediator enabled the envi-
romnental attomeys to trust Parr's assessment
.
that they should take a back seat role in the
negotiations and still have faith that their con-
cerns would be addressed.
DRCOG and the facilitators made a stra-
tegic decision to attempt to slow the Commit-
tee and step back from the implementation
task in order to build support and ownership
among elected officials for MetroVision's core
elements. They knew that moving to imple-
mentation without a sound plan could delay prog-
ress and jeopardize success.
Parr and Kermey's facilitation gave the group
a new sense of focus and helped minimize par-
ticipant frustration while raising group awareness
of their progress. Parr and Kenney came to
meetings with an agenda and set expectations for
what the group could accomplish in that session.
After meetings were underway, the facilitators
maintained focus, checked for agreement, en-
forced process agreements, and encouraged par-
ticipation. These interventions helped the group
identify, address, and resolve issues, as well as
avoid conflict. DRCOG staff and facilitators also
created a group memory by recording members'
observations on flip charts. This record provided
the group with "a neutral focus for debate" and
depersonalized ideas, allowing the whole group to
take ownership (Godschalk 1994:81). After
meetings, DRCOG staff compiled perspectives,
agreements, and decisions into a single working
document for discussion and modification at the
next meeting. Wording changes to those single
texts formed the basis for participants to achieve
their individual interests and ultimately group
consensus.
Keimedy, Benson, and McMillan (1982:43)
advise that "the more you can get [the person
with whom you are negotiating] to talk about his
position, by aiming questions for clarification and
explanation, the more he may inadvertently give
clues away about his commitment to his position
and the possible lines along which he is prepared
to move." Parr and Kenney provided ample time
to hear concerns, which they incorporated into a
structured process designed to highlight joint
gains. The Committee looked at the pros and cons
of each core element and the do-nothing scenario
for local jurisdictions and then for the region as a
whole.
Humor was an invaluable tool in Parr's bold
style; he departed from facilitators' conventional
wisdom of accepting and legitimizing all input by
participants. As Committee members learned they
could trust him, Parr shifted to a more activist,
mediator role. He enabled local elected officials
to chuckle at their re-iterations of "local control."
Hence, Parr helped the group "explain the reasons
behind [their] statements, questions, and actions,"
as part of "sharing all relevant information" and
focusing on interests rather than positions
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(Schwartz 1989:27). Ostensibly, this interven-
tion served to clarify and reframe, but in real-
ity, it was an invitation to "play" and expand
the current boundaries of thought and lan-
guage on the issue. He invited participants to
question their statements, test assumptions and
inferences, and develop agreements on what
important words meant.
Informal Meetings
Parr and Kenney kept in frequent contact
with participants between meetings. Casual
conversations and lunches provided opportu-
nities for "carefully assessing human factors
as well as technical issues...and designing a
strategy for the particular circum-
stances"(Carpenter and Kennedy 1988: 54).
Parr and Kenney thereby facilitated the emer-
gence of issues that had yet to come to the sur-
face, while simultaneously playing a subtle
advocacy role. In a version of advocacy plan-
ning, meetings with individual stakeholders
helped them clarify their own interests and
strategy. This strategy also created less risk of
divisiveness in the meetings, enabling Parr and
Kenney to avoid surprises. In turn, more coop-
erative meetings helped foster the positive
working relationships that enabled people to
use the same information, exchange new in-
formation, make agreements, and keep their
word. Godschalk's framework of conflict
types, techniques and forums "assumes that
many budding conflicts can be headed off
through direct negotiation in less formal or-
ganizational settings, thus limiting eruption of
'tooth and nail' conflicts with their win/lose
techniques and forums. These less formal set-
tings can be productive negotiation trainmg
grounds for networks of planners and public
officials committed to integrative rather than
zero sum bargaining" (Innes 1994:37).
DRCOG staff are also using informal
meetings to work on building negotiation-
friendly climates and procedures, identifying
issues early and dealing with them forth-
rightly, recognizing disputes and providing
resolution settings to avoid future conflict.
Other informal dispute prevention and early
resolution mechanisms that could be employed
include subregional outreach meetings, peri-
odic conversations and lunches with key play-
ers, and regular regional meetings of planners and
public officials. These ongoing mechanisms pro-
vide a way to address the inevitable conflicts that
arise with implementation.
Personal Effectiveness:
Building Good Working Relationships
Some group members were able to identify
individuals they considered particularly effective
or influential in the process. These members ex-
hibited important qualities for successful negotia-
tion, such as balancing emotions with rationality,
attempting to imderstand the perspectives and
behavior of others, listening and clear communi-
cation, reliability in promises and actions, open-
ness to persuasion based on acceptable criteria,
and acceptance of others' legitimacy as serious
partners (Godschalk 1994:82).
Regular participants built social capital that
facilitated agreement among the Steering Com-
mittee members. This enabled a network of trust
in which respectful, open-minded and informed
conversation could occur, and also reinforced the
qualities of good working relationships in Steer-
ing Committee interactions.
Participants generally attempted to try to un-
derstand the perspectives and behavior of others,
and were open to persuasion based on acceptable
criteria; environmentalists and the pro-growth
Mayor of Aurora were particularly influential in
this way. Though the two environmental attor-
neys had strong preferences for Oregon-style
growth control and a regulatory framework that
ensured performance, the attorneys primarily lis-
tened. They balanced their preferences with a ra-
tional assessment of the situation and made a
strategic decision to resist championing their
cause in exchange for better relationships with
their Committee members and the possibility of a
significant increase in ownership of the process
and commitment to implementation on the part of
elected officials. Their patience and restraint en-
abled the Steering Committee's greatest achieve-
ment: elected officials (re)development of and
commitment to growth management options they
could and would support.
Satisfying Substantive and Psychological
Needs of Stakeholders
For agreements to work, "they must be real-
istic and satisfy the substantive and psychological
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needs of the participants and stakeholders"
(Godschalk 1994:87). Local elected officials
achieved their substantive objectives of local
control; those who entered the negotiation
specifically to ensure that the program would
not become
regulatory also For agreements
met their goal. In fO WOrk, "they
general, these
must be realisticparticipants had
the satisfaction of and Satisfy the
viT:.ldtddtt substantive andiews an a dress
concerns. They psychological
perceived the
^^^j^ ^f ^^^
process as farr and -'
felt others listened participants and
to their points, stakeholders"
Afterwards only
(Godschalk 1994:87)
one elected
official
complained that environmentalists still played
too large a role and that the process was too
time-consuming. For Aurora Mayor Paul
Tauer, the fairness of the procedures and the
sense that his concerns were being heard was
critical to his increased confidence in the pro-
cess and growth management in general.
Though everyone took pride in the final
agreement and was glad to see the MetroVi-
sion process move forward, environmental,
business, and community representatives en-
joyed less psychological satisfaction. In con-
trast to elected officials, who perhaps had a
greater sense of how their attitudes to Metro-
Vision had shifted, other participants ex-
pressed doubts about what the process had
accomplished. Environmentalists were given
less respect and room to speak, and their hope
of achieving enforceable growth management
was quickly dashed, despite the credibility
they gained. The environmental community
continues to support the agreement as it moves
forward and serves as its strongest advocates.
Accurate Data and Projections
Accurate data and projections were key to
successful negotiations between DRCOG staff
and local planners in almost every jurisdiction.
Disputes over accuracy and an agreed starting
point for development projections formed the
grounds for only one jurisdiction's "refusal to
play." Negotiations with local planners regarding
the 2020 growth projections continued throughout
and after the work of the Steering Committee.
Studies and data generated by previous commit-
tees and DRCOG planners also offered an accu-
rate base of information, including considerations
of growth scenarios and costs of growth, from
which Steering Committee negotiations could
move forward. DRCOG planners had already re-
solved data accuracy and prediction issues with
most elected officials in the earlier scenario-
building/cost benefit phase of work under the
MetroVision Task Force. Had these issues not
been resolved, reaching resolution of differences
with elected officials on the Steering Committee
might not have been possible. Technical informa-
tion was often used by participants on both the
Task Force and Steering Committee to convince
one another that a problem actually existed, an
"essential first task for consensus building" (Innes
1994:103).
DRCOG acknowledged and respected differ-
ences of opinion about data issues in the Steering
Committee report, such as the preferred "fudge
factor" to be added to the projections. DRCOG'
s
data may also have shaped subsequent negotia-
tions because they came to the table first with
long-term projections; many local jurisdictions
previously confined their analysis to five year
projections and plans.
Predictive accuracy emerged as a critical
component of the Steering Committee process
when Mayor Tauer, a critical suburban opponent
of UGBs and the 700 square mile development
area, worked with his plaiming staff and found
that the City of Aurora could meet the 700-mile
target (Tauer and Woodward 1996). Confidence
in the accuracy of DRCOG' s predictions gave
other local officials on the Steering Committee
with similar concerns the security they needed to
make commitments or proceed to the next step,
and increased bargaining strength for DRCOG.
Accrued Investment
in Negotiations and Agreement
In the end, negotiations were able to proceed
because the final product on the table was supe-
rior to participants' proposed alternatives. Im-
portantly, DRCOG made sure that the "do- noth-
ing" scenario was included among alternatives, so
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when more regulatory or growth limiting sce-
narios were considered and rejected based on
the drawbacks, the deficiencies associated
with the current rate
of growth and land In the end,
consumption could
negotiations
be evaluated as °
well. As the Were able to
community proceed
representative said,
^
all participants DBCaUSe the
realized that final produCt
"Denver is growing
so fast, no one will ^^ '•'^^ taOLe
be very happy" with y^as Superior tO
a do-nothing ^. . ^
,
scenario (Henley participants
1996). At the very propOSCd
alternatives.
least, those elected
officials who would
have been happier
with the do-nothing scenario became part of a
larger process and voted with their peers to
recommend Board approval of the revised
plan. While some local elected officials may
have had a shorter-run view, the cost of im-
pending negotiations with DRCOG on future
transportation and water plans also held some
uncertainty and risk for local govenmients.
Participants concluded they were better off
with the agreement than without it.
Participants' time and personal investment
also factored into the final agreement, func-
tioning as accrual costs. As Irmes observed in
several California processes, "the desire to
have something to show for the months or
years of hard work, along with the desire to be
supportive to the group with which they had
developed working relationships and some
common cause, proved to be important incen-
tives to reach agreement," (Innes 1994:37).
Implementation
The Steering Committee's implementation
strategies are largely descriptive, but they have
several characteristics of a durable agreement.
The group seems to have found common
ground, feeling that the agreement is mostly
soUd, fair, and realistic. The agreement is hon-
est because it was "based on the best-
available, jointly developed informa-
tion,...founded on realistic projections of capaci-
ties and costs," and "developed with the involve-
ment of all parties" (Innes 1994:42). The product
did not disadvantage significant stakeholders who
were often absent, such as the business partici-
pants.
The acceptability of the agreement is the best
factor for its potential implementation. The proc-
ess used to develop the agreement addressed
elected officials concerns regarding local control,
previously the greatest obstacle to growth man-
agement in the region, and was perceived as fair
by all. A greater level of honesty may be present
now than when the Board approved the MetroVi-
sion Framework without solid support. Further-
more, the agreement provides incentives for all
parties to implement it.
Implications for Collaborative
Regional Planning
Denver's experience with collaborative re-
gional planning reveals lessons that planners in
other regions could use.
Foster an open process, where all necessary
information for decision-making is provided to
participants. Encourage an openness to hearing
and learningfrom all parties involved. MetroVi-
sion benefited from the trust and exploration of
new ideas during the multi-year group process.
Nevertheless, DRCOG leadership decided to
avoid daunting elected officials with the implica-
tions of growth management, instead reassuring
them that they were entirely in the driver's seat.
Consequently, few Denver-area citizens were ac-
quainted with MetroVision, especially in later
phases, and the project lacked potential support
from greater citizen involvement.
Those who volunteered for or were recruited
to MetroVision task forces embarked on a contin-
ual learning process about the needs and concerns
of other participants and about new growth man-
agement options. The DRCOG Development
Services staff provided the Committees with all
the helpful information at their disposal in order
for the Committee to realize the extent of its
power and come to the decision it considered
best.
The learning and decision-making process
among the wide array of participants over the
seven-year period was protracted, messy, and po-
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litical, but the agreement benefited from the
subsequent broad ownership that such a
democratic approach generates. Moreover,
participants knew the plan and its internal
workings inside and out, which cannot be said
of participants on many other committees both
within and outside of DRCOG. Patience with
long time frames, regular participation, and
informed, respectful, and open interaction
built the social capital needed to come to final
agreement.
Use Facilitators. Facilitation provided the
Steering Committee advantages the previous
task forces did not enjoy. Facilitators ensured
that the issues raised were handled in a more
systematic manner than on earlier committees.
By helping participants identify issues and
goals and set agendas, the facilitators gave the
Steering Committee greater task-orientation,
allowed participants to place their work and
progress in context, and helped the Steering
Committee note and celebrate accomplish-
ments.
Outside facilitation enabled DRCOG staff
to serve the committees as technical assistants
without leading the process in such a visible
way that group ownership suffered. This level
of independent ownership also enabled the
facilitators to push the group along in consid-
ering various topics and challenging assump-
tions to an extent DRCOG or more neutral
facilitators could never have attempted. The
Steering Committee facilitators exercised a
wide degree of latitude. The recording facili-
tator often paraphrased participants' com-
ments to get at the gist of what they were
saying, instead of using their own words. The
facilitators also conducted outside listening
and strategy meetings with individuals and
subsets of Steering Committee members, often
without DRCOG' s or the Committee's knowl-
edge. Other regional agencies seeking facilita-
tion services might prefer more neutral facili-
tators.
Involve all critical stakeholders. Insuffi-
cient involvement at one point in the process
may not sink the process if steps are taken to
remedy the problem.
The Steering Committee process caught and
remedied critical weaknesses in the MetroVision
task force process. As leaders in the process,
DRCOG thereby avoided some process pitfalls
Innes observed in a study of intergovernmental
groups whose products have not been used or
their agreements shared by the wider public. "In
some cases, the groups failed to include key
stakeholders, who later sabotaged the effort; in
some the groups did not operate long enough;"
but "in many, the groups and their findings were
not well linked to the institutionalized procedures
and political processes by which decisions are
actually made" (Innes 1994:451).
The MetroVision Framework gave elected of-
ficials something to respond to and provided a
basis for further thinking about growth manage-
ment. In that way, the Framework can be seen as
the other stakeholders opening bid in regional
negotiations on growth management. Elected of-
ficials critically examined that bid and based their
counter-offer upon it. The result was an accept-
able agreement.
Power disparities cannot be entirely elimi-
nated; they are a fact of life that must be ad-
dressed. Though some dispute resolution profes-
sionals and academics may criticize the gross
power disparities on the Steering Committee, oth-
ers might conclude that elected officials acted
appropriately as the principal decision makers in
a process ultimately intended to gamer approval
of metro area elected officials on the DRCOG
Board of Directors. The prominent role of elected
officials in the culmination of the Denver region's
MetroVision process accords with what dispute
resolution and collaborative plaiming profession-
als and scholars have learned in other places.
Brock and Cormick note that "principal domina-
tion of the conflict resolution process, with staff
and experts in supporting roles, is necessary to
build decision maker commitment and consensus.
Thus, in intergovernmental disputes involving
elected officials, they must control the negotiation
to generate their sense of ownership" (Innes
1992:370). Furthermore, in the two successfully
resolved dispute-level dilenmias in another series
of case studies of intergovernmental development
dilemmas, a working group of elected officials
dominated the process (Godschalk 1992).
CAROLINA PLANNING • WINTER 1999 63
MARIE VENNER
The local officials' level of participation
on the Steering Committee allowed them to
generate an important sense of ownership. As
Innes observed with group processes to de-
velop growth management plans in other
states, the MetroVision process, "created an
alliance of key players and leaders who speak
for the plan. Many of these players, because
they were part of the negotiations, now have a
stake in the plan's implementation" (Innes
1992:450).
Utilize existing authorities. DRCOG has
significant power to support MetroVision but
has not used it effectively. The Transportation
Division has maintained an evaluation system
in which project prioritization, DRCOG'
s
greatest source of incentives, continues largely
as it has in the past. During the Transportation
Improvement Plan (TIP) criteria re-evaluation
process during May-July 1997, Transportation
Division staff reviewed and justified their ex-
isting process in great detail but chose not to
emphasize the reviewing committee's author-
ity to significantly restructure the ranking
system and give greater priority to non-auto
modes. Admittedly, many local representa-
tives would not want to see the road projects
they submit compete against transit for a pool
of funds some consider insufficient. Never-
theless, DRCOG' s technically oriented system
assumes that project types (ranging from
roadway widenings funded by the State
Transportation Program (STP) to bike lanes
funded by enhancement dollars) cannot be
compared based on their adequacy to meet
larger transportation objectives. Thus funding
is allocated and pools are targeted to each
project type. Federal Transit Authority dollars
and the Regional Transportation District's
taxing authority are assumed to be the sole
source of funds for transit in the region, de-
spite ISTEA's attempt to change the rules of
the game and the Transportation Division's
orders that more free funds be directed to tran-
sit. The transit-related goals which abound in
DRCOG' s Regional Transportation Plan apply
only to the regional transit agency, not
DRCOG decision-making, though the plan
clearly stipulates that plan policies and objec-
tives are to guide DRCOG' s TIP criteria. Al-
though the Transportation Division has made
some changes to its point system, DRCOG could
make greater use of its legislative authority by
making the opportunities created by the conjunc-
tion of regional planning and federal legislation
clear to decision-making boards.
Treat the public as your partner and utilize
public opinion. DRCOG responded to pressure
from earlier MetroVision Task Force members,
particularly community members, non-profit en-
vironmentalists, and those from environmental
government agencies, to involve the public. In
1994 and 1995 the agency undertook significant
outreach related to criteria and scenario-building
exercises. DRCOG staff made presentations to
local groups and governments, talked on local
cable access charmels, and set up displays in li-
braries around the region. A region-wide survey
affirmed citizen interest in and support for the
priorities of the six core elements of the Frame-
work and subsequent MetroVision Plan. How-
ever, the public involvement and commimication
effort was insufficient, and the effort dropped off
considerably in following years.
Despite this , ,.
promising public • • -PW^JtiC
outreach start, which OUtreach is
still failed to satisfy
, ^ „„„ „i».t»H ^ffi now moresome non-elected otii-
ciai task force important than
members, DRCOG
^^^j. tO the
made a strategic de-
cision to return the implementation
focus to the Board
ofa plan,
members, who they
optimisticaUy which belongS
assumed to be and pertains to
representing and
commimicating with ^^^ entire
their local metro region
constituency as their
audience and
customer. Despite support from local elected offi-
cials on the Steering Committee, the lack of an
external communications strategy deprived the
MetroVision plan of a potentially large and influ-
ential body of support. An early sample survey
indicated strong public support for plan concepts,
but almost no outreach occurred subsequently.
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DRCOG staff say that money for commu-
nications outside of report publication has al-
ways been scarce at the agency. Hence, the
agency employs a strategy far-removed from
Portland's, which makes ample use of focus
groups, door hangers, regional media inserts,
and blanket surveys. While DRCOG staff say
regional newspapers have kept the impacts of
regional growth in the public eye, newspapers
have found it hard to cover a process like
MetroVision. Though MetroVision staff re-
sponded to the critical need to build support
among elected officials over the past two
years, public outreach is now more important
than ever to the implementation of a plan
which belongs and pertains to the entire metro
region. DRCOG hired a communications con-
sultant in early 1999, but the focus remains on
developing a strategy for communication with
regional political and business leaders..
Effective planning can occur in the ab-
sence of regulatory authority. At the very
least, voluntary, collaborative planning pro-
vides an important and sound basis forfuture
efforts, regulatory or not. If long-range re-
gional land use planning efforts waited for
regulatory authority in places like the Denver
region, they might never happen. Yet fast-
growing areas that depend on environmental
amenities and clean air still need to respond to
the impacts of growth and make choices about
investments for the future. In such places, a
significant ground of support exists for man-
aging congestion and the untrammeled growth
that robs places of their character. Many resi-
dents and local leaders are committed to then-
places, whether they see that as their neigh-
borhood, town, region, or state. Participation
in discussion on these issues can lead to
agreement. Visioning is an exercise that seeks
to extend participants' attention to the region
as a whole, drawing out and working from
their commonalties.
Greater objections and problems will al-
ways emerge as plans become more specific
and implementation issues are addressed, but
collaborative plans enable participants to try to
get all parties on board and experiment with
what they can do without regulatory authority.
If voluntary noncompliance threatens to obvi-
ate the plan, local governments that have
"played" and have significant investment and
ownership in the plan may call for regulatory
authority.
Plans that represent multiple years of effort
by stakeholders take on their own momentum.
The relationships among
participants and social If long-vauge
capital can elicit regional
cooperative action where it
otherwise may not have IClTlCl USe
occurred. Sometimes buy- planning
in may be acquired easily ^
through time spent lis- ^JJ^'^^
tening and an earnest waitedfor
attempt to meet the other's j .
needs CoUaborative regulatory
planning ensures that this authoHty in
opportunity is not missed
^^^^^ ;
-^^A collaborative approach '^
also defuses the intensity of the Denver
opposition and greatly
-^
^^
decreases the probability ° -^
that a previously overruled might never
or unheard minority will hawen
overturn a plan.
Staff, local
representatives, and stakeholder groups have
crafted an entirely voluntary plan with broad ac-
ceptance and buy-in, providing a model for re-
gional growth management in a low regulatory
environment. The rewards of collaborative and
inclusive planning take time, and DRCOG may
not entirely deserve the impatience of previous
committee members who question what happened
to the process and the products of their previous
efforts. Planners often neglect to tell the story of
the decade-long efforts by the League of Women
Voters and Oregon environmental groups before
Oregon's growth management plan was enacted
in the early 1970s. The state of Oregon, Multno-
mah County, and Portland are still making ad-
justments and working out the kinks in their 25-
year experiment. The Denver region is in the first
stages of its process. MetroVision has created an
invaluable foundation for future efforts as well as
an experiment in voluntary and collaborative re-
gional planning that provides valuable lessonsfor
future regional planning efforts nationwide. ^^
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Endnotes
1 From Westword, Denver's independent weekly:
'"If we can build to meet the housing demand
within the growth boundary, we probably
don't have that much of a problem with it,'
says Steve Wilson, director of government af-
fairs for the Home Builders Association of
Metro Denver. Wilson says homebuilders in
Portland, Oregon, a city that's had a growth
boundary for almost twenty years, have sup-
ported the idea there. What frustrates local
developers, says Wilson, is the crazy quilt of
government regulations that now exists in the
metro area. "We have some communities
with arbitrary growth limits," he says, and be-
cause many cities fear being overrun by tract
homes or apartment complexes "there's con-
tinuous pressure for less and less density"
(Steers 1996). Wilson adds that homebuilders
often propose politically correct high-density
projects and then find themselves in a battle
with neighborhood groups that want to require
large yards for every new home. Wilson sat
on later MetroVision committees.
2 On the previous MetroVision task force, business
representatives were active but small in num-
ber. Interviewed by the Denver Business
Journal at the close of the task force process,
Anthony Gengaro, a planner with his own firm
and a representative of the homebuilding
community on the task force said "the amount
of growth allowed, which should be plenty,
won't be as controversial as how to divide it."
Gengaro also said, "most business people
don't have the time to sit through hours of
meetings. Nor do they like being outnumbered
20 to 1 by opponents. ...but business must have
a role in fleshing out the plan to guarantee it is
something everyone can live with." Gengaro
also said, "When you can't build consensus,
the status quo continues." Task force member
and Editor of the Urban Design Forum news-
letter, Christine Ford, said she was troubled by
the lack of business involvement in the proc-
ess, which was dominated by government and
public interest types. "It hasn't dawned on the
business community that if they don't take a
hand in it, it could outsmart them" (Svaldi
1995:36A).
3 Nevertheless, DRCOG staff felt that environ-
mentalists undermined their position and fur-
ther marginalized the environmental commu-
nity whenever they raised the more regulatory
Oregon alternative. Local officials considered
that option excluded at the first meeting, and
frequently rolled their eyes and became more bel-
ligerent when it was mentioned. [Woodard 1996]
4 Elected officials on the Steering Committee made
presentations to other elected officials and plan-
ners at sub-regional meetings throughout the
Steering Committee process. Such meetings of-
fered the committee a helpful feedback mecha-
nism for local input, enabling the committee to
discover and address potential problems before
they could generate much momentum.
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